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I. INTRODUCTION

One of the most significant events in the field of development in recent years has been the effort to incorporate social concerns into the
mainstream agenda of market reform and economic development.
Largely excluded from the first generation reform agenda, the "social"
Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. Many thanks to David Trubek, Louise
Trubek, Scott Newton, Ruth Buchanan, Heinz Klug, John Ohnesorge, Alvaro Santos, Karl
the workshop
Klare, David Kennedy, Greg Shaffer, Joseph R. Thome, and Robert Wai and to
participants at the laws schools at Cornell, Michigan, Wisconsin-Madison and Northeastern
universities for comments and criticisms.
*
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diversion has been brought back in through the introduction of a series
of additions and reforms, sometimes referred to as "second-generation"
reforms or the "post Washington Consensus," to the development agenda
of the international financial institutions (IFIs).
This is a marked shift in the framing of development policy and priorities. Prior to second generation reforms, social concerns were sharply
distinguished from economic concerns; especially to the extent that they
were in any sense political, they were seen as not only extraneous to but
sometimes even in conflict with the pursuit of economic development.
Thus, second generation reforms mark not only the recognition of the
social side of development policy, but an effort to make the two sides to
co-exist more easily.
This paper probes the manner in which the IFIs are managing the incorporation of social justice and greater participation in the development
agenda, and describes how the pursuit of social objectives, in turn, is
affected by the governance agenda as a whole.
A convenient marker of the second generation reforms is the appearance of the World Bank's (Bank) Comprehensive Development
Framework (CDF). Originally presented as a discussion draft circulated
by the Bank's president,' the CDF identifies two sides to the development agenda. In addition to the macroeconomic and financial aspects of
economic growth, the CDF pronounces that greater attention must now
be paid to its "social, structural and human" dimensions. Along with
greater attention to issues such as health, education and gender equality,
factors such as human rights, good governance and the rule of law are
explicitly identified as central to the achievement of development. In
addition, the CDF holds that the process of development must be returned to its subjects: no longer a one-size-fits-all agenda that is
orchestrated and imposed from above, second generation reforms propose greater country-ownership of the reform process and a development
agenda that is generated in a more inclusive and participatory way.
The CDF is represents a holistic framework that, according to the
Bank, is now widely accepted as the basis for both generating development policy and achieving sustainable development The principles and
norms it articulates inform the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers which
now ground the formulation of development policy for specific States' as
1.

James D. Wolfensohn, A Proposalfor a Comprehensive Development
Framework,
INSTUTIONELE
ONTWIKKELING
(May
1999), available at http://
www.euforic.org/rondzend/may99.htm.
2.
WORLD BANK, What is CDF: Ten Things You Should
Know About CDF, available
at http://www.worldbank.org/cdf/.
3.
For a description see The World Bank Group PovertyNet Home,
at http://
www.worldbank.org/poverty/strategies/.
RONZENDING
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well as a wide range of other development initiatives and activities. Nor
is the shift embodied in the CDF solely confined to the IFIs: the move
toward greater attention to concrete social objectives is confirmed on the
wider international stage in the broad endorsement of the Millennium
Development Goals. 4
Second generation reforms are the result of diverse catalysts for
change both internal and external to the IFIs. Among the critiques of first
generation, neoliberal, reforms were that they had more to do with the
interests of international actors in debt recovery, market access and the
protection of investments than with economic growth of States to which
that seemed
they were applied.5 In addition, reforms entailed practices
6 In the view of
sovereignty.
of
obviously problematic from the standpoint
had long been
some, they furthered a conception of development that
7
disclosed as narrow, if not pathological, in its focus. In addition, they
appeared to impose disproportionate risks, costs and burdens on particular groups such as women and workers. First generation reforms were
also subject to a range of internal critiques, the most telling of which
were that they failed in their efforts to generate economic growth and to
alleviate poverty by ignoring and arguably damaging the aggregate wel9
fare of the societies in which they operated.
Second generation reforms attempt to respond to these arguments in
two ways, by expanding the ambit of development reforms to encompass
a greater range of concerns and objectives and by instituting or endorsing a range of procedural changes that place an enhanced emphasis on
popular participation and access to services, including courts. It would
be a mistake, however, to understand the transformed agenda solely as a
response to these now well-publicized critiques, and it would be inadequate to explain the path that second generation reforms have taken in
United Nations Millennium Development Goals, available at http://www.un.org/
4.
millenniumgoals/.
See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002);
5.
Encounter: Violence and
BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, InternationalLaw and the Development
LAW PROCEEDINGS 16
INTERNATIONAL
OF
SOCIETY
AMERICAN
93d
Margins,
Resistance at the

(1999).

James T. Gatthi, Good Governance as a Counter-InsurgencyAgenda to Opposi6.
RTS L. REV.
tional and Transformative Social Projects in InternationalLaw, 5 BUFF. HUM.
107 (1999).
found
Among the best-known alternative indices is the Human Development Index
7.
PROGRAMME,
DEVELOPMENT
U.N.
generally
see
Program;
Development
Nation
in the United
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT (New York: Oxford, various years).
VISee GITA SEN & CAREN GROWN, DEVELOPMENT, CRISES, AND ALTERNATIVE
8.
distributive
the
of
analysis
an
For
(1987);
SIONs: THIRD WORLD WOMEN'S PERSPECTIVE
RECHARACTERIZING REvalence of reforms in the context of transition, see KERRY RITTICH,

REFORM (2002).
STRUCTURING: LAW, DISTRIBUTION AND GENDER IN MARKET
HUMAN FACE (1987); STIGLITZ,
A
WITH
ADJUSTMENT
AL.,
ET
CORNIA
A.
GIOVANNI
9.

supra note 5.
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any event. Instead, a series of other events seem to have prompted a
transformation of the agenda at roughly the same time. Among them
was
the appearance of Amartya Sen's influential Development as Freedom.
Following its appearance in 1999, development began to be articulated
as a project to promote not simply economic growth but a broader
set of
human freedoms and the capacities to realize them.'0 Imagining development as freedom seemed to both authorize the approach
to
development policy and market reform on which the IFIs had already
embarked as well as signal a shift in the direction of a more humane,
responsive, and mature concept of development. Imagining development
as freedom also helped to explain the elevation of human rights and
the
rule of law to the status of development ends or objectives. In addition,
the IFIs themselves had come to the conclusion that greater attention
to
some social issues, such as gender equality," might generate better
economic outcomes because they appeared to be promising routes by
which
to enhance levels of investment in human capital. The cultivation of
human capital, in turn, had by then been identified as crucial to economic
success in the emerging knowledge-based economy.12 To put it another
way, attention to some social issues that once lay outside the purview
of
the IFIs and beyond the gaze of market reformers became justified
in the
name of economic development itself. Finally systemic crises of various
sorts, from the stalled or failed transition in many countries in Eastern
3
Europe and the CIS

to the East-Asian financial crisis, provoked calls

for a new institutional architecture. In the aggregate, these events
converged to produce a development agenda that substantially enlarged
the
list of best practices and governance strategies that were promoted by
the
IFIs in the first half of the 1990s.
While restatements of the development agenda have become routine
rather than exceptional in recent years, the shift towards the social
seems
unlikely to be transitory. The development and market reform projects
of
the IFIs, the Bank in particular, no longer revolve solely around the
promotion of economic growth; at least at the rhetorical level, social
issues
10.
See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999). Endorsements
of this idea
have been widespread among the international economic institutions.
See for example WORLD
BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000/2001: ATTACKING
POVERTY (2001); U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 2000 (2000).

11.

WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK POLICY RESEARCH REPORT:
ENGENDERING DEVEL-

OPMENT-THROUGH GENDER EQUALITY IN RIGHTS,
RESOURCES AND VOICE (2001).
12.
WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT
1999-2000: KNOWLEDGE FOR DEVELOPMENT (1999). See also Thomas Courchene,

Human Capital in an Information Era, 28

CAN. PUB. POL'Y 73 (2002).

13.
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Whither Reform? Ten Years of Transition,
Keynote Address at
Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics
(April 28, 1999), available at
http://www.worldbank'org/research/abcde/washington-I 11/pdfs/stiglitz.pdf.
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have now been accepted both as ends of development in and of themselves and as important factors to the achievement of general economic
growth. As a result, issues ranging from human rights to gender equality
no longer stand outside the development agenda, nor is their importance
to economic development still seriously debated. Even the issue of
4
equality is now incorporated into the agenda. While some still take the
position that social concerns are outside the development agenda, a distraction from the main task of generating economic growth, this
perspective is now in the minority as and the inclusion of the social has
now been substantially normalized within the frame of development.
This evolution has shifted the center of gravity in debates around development and social justice in significant ways. Radical critiques of the
5
development agenda remain. In addition, new historical scholarship
indicates that some of the social deficits now at issue may be traceable to
institutional structures and practices that linger on from earlier moments
6
in the international order. Within the mainstream community, however,
debates now largely focus upon the way to conceive the merged economic/social agenda, the relationship between the social and the
macroeconomic or financial dimensions of globalization, and the means
by which social concerns are to be furthered.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to say much about what a commitment to the importance of the social, structural, and human means in the
abstract; the same might be said about claims that the reform process
should now become more participatory, transparent and democratic. Assessing the varied effects of reforms on the ground is notoriously
difficult in any event; the extent to which it is safe or even possible to
attribute development outcomes, whether positive or negative, to particular
interventions and changes is itself one of the most deeply contested issues
in contemporary development debates. Hence the questions. Beyond the
reformulated commitment at the rhetorical level, in what ways and to what
extent do second generation reforms represent a new and different development strategy, a rupture from the past, versus a continuation or
elaboration of the project that has been underway for the last decade and a
half? To what extent is there either overlap or conflict between the old
For example, the World Bank's 2006 Word Development Report will be devoted to
14.
the theme of equity and development.
For a representative selection, see generally THE POST-DEVELOPMENT READER
15.
(Majid Rahnema & Victoria Bawtree eds., 1997).
FiSee Antony Anghie, lime Present and ime Past: Globalization, International
16.
Antony
nancial Institutions, and the Third World, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 243 (2000);
Economy, and
Anghie, Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty,
(2002);
the Mandate System of the League of Nations, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 513
BALAKRISHNAN

RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW:

MOVEMENTS AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE (2003).

DEVELOPMENT,

SOCIAL
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(and enduring) imperative of promoting economic growth and the new
focus on social issues?
A. Law and the Incorporationof the Social

This analysis proceeds from the assumption that one of the most
productive and revealing ways to analyze the transformative potential of
second generation reforms is by analyzing the way that they are imagined and made operational at the level of legal rules and institutions. If a
crucial question is whether, and to what extent, second generation reforms represent a transformative moment in development and market
reform thinking and practice, there is a variety of reasons why law might
provide a crucial lens on the matter.
Law is a condition of possibility of both social justice and democratic participation; even if law were not explicitly emphasized, it would
remain important to assess effects of the legal and institutional environment on the realization of social goals. However, second generation
reforms themselves center law in new and important ways. The instrumental value of law to development is now well established: whether
under the rubric of the rule of law, good governance, or best practices,
the legal and institutional environment of economic growth has become
a site of intense interest and activity in the world of development.' 7 Indeed, legal and institutional reforms are increasingly identified as the
key to successful development. But not only is law instrumentally important to development; with second generation reforms it is also
definitional to development. While the simultaneous installation of law
and the social as ends of development may be purely serendipitous, myriad policy documents from the IFIs themselves point to the importance
of the rule of law and good governance in securing the social dimension
of development. For these reasons, if no other, we might expect a
widened conception of development to be reflected in the prescriptions
about the legal and policy environment for economic growth and greater
participation and democratization to inform the processes through which
it is to be generated.
Following this intuition, this paper considers the nature and place of
legal rules and institutions in the reformed development agenda; the uses
to which they are put; the values and interests they seem to advance; the
justifications that underlie them; and their impact on the social objectives
to which the IFIs have now committed. It also considers the way that
17.
References to good governance are now ubiquitous; for a classic effort
to articulate
their place in market reforms as a whole, see the collection of essays
in IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA,
COMPLEMENTARY REFORM:

ESSAYS ON LEGAL, JUDICIAL AND OTHER INSTITUTIONAL
REFORMS SUPPORTED BY THE WORLD BANK (1997).
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social concerns are articulated in this agenda and how their relationship
to economic growth is represented and justified. Thus, the paper explores
two interrelated questions: To what extent is the regulatory and institutional frame of development altered by the inclusion of social and
democratic objectives? What is the impact of the legal and institutional
frame on these social and democratic objectives, and what does the current trajectory toward social justice look like as a consequence?
At this point, it seems possible to advance a number of tentative
conclusions. First, second generation reforms confirm and consolidate
the growing importance of law to development: in important ways, development simply is now a legal/institutional reform project. What is
new in second generation reforms is that the importance of legal reform
is no longer limited to its role in fostering economic growth; instead
those same reforms are now also represented as critical to the achievement of social objectives. Moreover, law itself has become a constitutive
element of development: respect for the rule of law; the implementation
of particular institutions; and the recognition of certain legal rights have
become definitional to the achievement of development itself. Second,
despite the expansion of the development agenda and with the important
exception of the reforms associated with access to justice initiatives, neither the basic institutional architecture nor the substantive content of the
core legal reform agenda has appreciably changed. Third, despite the
importance ascribed to law for certain purposes, there is also a new consciousness of the limits of law and a new interest in non-regulatory and
mixed modes of governance, especially in respect of social issues. This
is reflected in the emphasis on soft forms of regulation and non-legal
norms as well as the expanded role given to non-state actors in functions
ranging from norm generation to monitoring and compliance. Fourth, the
effort to take greater account of social concerns appears to work both
with and against the effort to preserve or expand the zone of democratic
and sovereign control over development policies and priorities. It registers as a point of tension in second generation reforms, for the following
reason. Conceptions of social justice are not merely being incorporated
into development, they are being transformed in their encounter with and
accommodation to other imperatives within the development agenda.
The suggestion here is that the encounter of the economic and the social
in second generation reforms has led not only to what is most apparent,
an enlarged development and market reform agenda; it has led to a
struggle around the nature of the social objectives and the strategies by
which they should be pursued.
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DEFINING SECOND GENERATION REFORMS

A. The Rise of Good Governance or Best Practice
in Law and Institutions
The social critiques of development and market reform are directly
connected to a fundamental shift in the activities of the IFIs: the move
from project- to policy-based development lending, and the promotion
by the IFIs of increasingly comprehensive notions of good governance in
a globally integrated economy. While there were also trenchant critiques
of traditional project-based lending, 8 most have been directed at the attempt to promote economic integration through policy and regulatory
transformation, convergence and harmonization in the neoliberal style.
Given the mixed genesis of second generation reforms, however, it is
useful to rehearse the evolution of the governance and legal project as a
whole.
As has long passed into general knowledge, since the 1980s the IFIs
have been among the most forceful proponents of market fundamentalism.' 9 Actively promoting the market as the engine of growth and social
welfare, they have sought to both reduce and redirect the role of the State
in economic activity and to reconfigure the structure of entitlements
governing market transactions with the aim of providing an environment
conducive to private sector investment. This is a project that began with
a limited focus on macroeconomic issues, expanded during the early to
mid-1990s to include legal and institutional concerns, and is expanding
still further in the context of second generation reforms and the inclusion
of the social.
As the IFIs shifted their efforts from project to policy based lending,
they began to attach conditions to the release of funds. Over time, they
developed and deployed a variety of other soft mechanisms to promote
the reforms that they regarded as optimal as well. These ranged from
technical advice, including legal advice, to States; thematic reports and
policy prescriptions on an increasingly wide range of development topics; and empirical research on the determinants of growth, much of
which was conducted within the framework of neoclassical and institutional economic assumptions. ° Policy interventions were originally
based upon commitments to liberalization, privatization, deregulation,
and the promotion of macroeconomic stability through inflation control,
18.
For example, objections to the Bank's engagement in the Narmada Dam project
provoked the creation of an internal adjudicatory body authorized to hear a limited range
of
complaints about its activities. For a description, see IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD
BANK INSPECTION PANEL (1994).
19.
STIGLITZ, supra note 5.
20.
SHIHATA, supra note 17.
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tax reform and fiscal austerity, all as prescriptions that literally came to
define the Washington Consensus.2 ' These factors, however, were supplemented over time by an explicit focus on the legal and regulatory
framework in which economic transactions take place. This was a consequence of something that became starkly apparent in the transition
economies which is that, contrary to earlier assumptions that markets
22
would simply spring up once regulatory impediments were removed,
markets do not generate the conditions of their own success. The recognition that "institutions matter"23 as well as the increasing focus on both
the substantive and procedural legal reforms that have been a feature of
the development of agenda since the mid-1990s, also gained force from
another direction: this was the conclusion that corruption, a lack of respect for the rule of law, and various other governance failures lay at the
root of the ongoing dilemmas of development, particularly in SubSaharan Africa.24
Both a consequence and a cause of the turn to institutions is that development has been reconceived largely as a question of governance.
Legal and judicial reform now regularly appear at the top of the list of
fundamental structural reforms25 and the policy documents of the IFIs are
pervaded with statements to the effect that that economic development
requires respect for the rule of law, protection of property and other investors rights, and now, human rights.26 So far, however, any deficiencies
in the realm of governance are mostly attributed to national rather than
international rules, norms and institutions. There are well-recognized
economic pressures on the Nation State in an era of globalization and
consequent limits on its capacity to act independently of those constraints. In addition, developing states face formidable barriers to
participating in the design of the global institutional order and suffer
predictable detriments as a result.27 Despite these well-documented problems, injunctions to respect the rule of law, combat corruption and
John Williamson, Democracy and the Washington Consensus, 21 WORLD DEV.
21.
1329 (1993).
On this position, see JEFFREY SACHS, POLAND'S LEAP TO THE MARKET ECONOMY
22.

(1993).
23.

This provoked a partial rehabilitation, under strictly disciplined conditions, of the

state in the processes of economic development. See WORLD
REPORT 1997: THE STATE IN A CHANGING WORLD (1997)
24.

WORLD BANK, SUB-SAHARAN

BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT

AFRICA: FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABLE

GROWTH

THE IMF's ROLE (1997).
See, e.g., WORLD BANK, supra note 2.

(1989); GooD GOVERNANCE:
25.
26.

For an effort to describe the components and the rationale for the legal reform prosupra note 17.
See, e.g., Gerald K. Helleiner, Markets, Politics and Globalization: Can the Global
27.
Economy be Civilized? UNCTAD 10th Raul Prebisch Lecture (Dec. 11, 2000) (CIS, Working
Paper No. 2000-1).

ject, see

SHIHATA,
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engage in institutional reform to attract investment, remain central to the
reform agenda. These tendencies suggest that, in the eyes of the IFIs, if
not elsewhere, any failures of governance are still located at the domestic
level.
The basic thrust of the reform agenda since its inception has been to
promote a market friendly legal and institutional order organized around
the protection of property rights, the enforcement of contracts, and the
provisions of other rules and institutions required to ensure a stable and
attractive investment climate. 8 The argument for structural reforms is
that the adoption of these rules, norms and best practices are the precondition to participation in the global economic order, without which no
State can now hope to achieve growth and escape from poverty. Nor are
they irrelevant outside the developing world: rather, they apply equally
to states that are already industrialized, on the theory that they are now
necessary if states are to protect themselves and their citizens from irreversible declines in their fortunes and well-being in a globally integrated
economy. 29
The original impetus for the introduction of a legal agenda into the
development project was law's instrumental value to development. The
Bank advanced a general argument about law's role in the success of
reforms as a whole, as well as a set of more specific claims about the
relationship of particular legal rules, for example property and contract,
to economic efficiency and growth. These arguments retain their force;
indeed, the Bank increasingly attempts to shore up these theoretical
claims with empirical evidence.30 With second generation reforms, however, law has also broken free of this connection; as part of the "social,
structural and human" dimension of development, law has now been invested with intrinsic value. With the move to development as freedom
and the incorporation of human rights, law has become an independent
objective in its own right.
The ideal regulatory agenda was originally envisioned as a regime
that is relatively free of state "interventions" and regulatory encumbrances, on the theory that they were likely to impede efficient
transactions and impair the extent and quality of investment. Since at
least 1997,"' the Bank has rejected a purely minimalist or night watchman conception of the State and recognized that a variety of distortions,
28.

For a more detailed consideration of the logic of the legal reform agenda, see RITsupra note 8, chapter 2.
29.
WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: ADVANCING STRUCTURAL REFORMS, ch. 3 (2004).
30.
WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS IN 2004: UNDERSTANDING REGULATION (2003);
WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS IN 2005: REMOVING OBSTACLES TO GROWTH (2004).
31.
WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997: THE STATE IN A CHANGING
WORLD (1997).
TICH,
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market failures and externalities may warrant intervention and regulatory
action in at least some instances. For example, the Bank as well as other
international financial and economic institutions became acutely aware
as a result of the transition process that privatization prior to the installation of an adequate regulatory infrastructure could result in "the opaque
32
transfer of ownership, corruption, and the dissipation of assets". The
arguments for regulation, however, remain securely tethered to the goals
33
of enhancing the competitiveness and efficiency of markets. Moreover,
except to the extent that they have been reconsidered because of their
clear contributions to productivity-enhancement, claims about the nature
of efficient and pro-competitive interventions remain largely as they
were in the first generation reforms. Conventional wisdom in the IFIs
remains opposed to the use of regulation for purposes other than the correction of market failures; technocratic advice on policy retains a strong
presumption about the likelihood of corruption and government failure.
Together, these serve to limit both the purposes and the reach of legal
reform; the presumption of government failure often undercuts the case
for intervention by the State even where it might be otherwise warranted
under the logic of efficiency enhancement. It is also important to note
that, quite apart from these articulated concerns, the logic of regulation
and intervention has always operated somewhat unevenly within and
34
across different sectors in ways that are difficult to explain. Notwithstanding the modifications to the very conception of development, the
Bank retains an enduring attachment both to its initial position on "good
law" for development and an abiding wariness of the state and still describes as axiomatic the proposition that growth is most likely to result
from policies of deregulation and liberalization that encourage foreign
investment.35
B. From Critiqueto Reform
The social critique of this project has taken two basic forms. One is
that efforts to consolidate a global economic architecture around marketcentered policies systemically neglected the social dimension of economic

32.

WORLD

STRATEGIC

BANK

DIRECTIONS

LEGAL

VICE-PRESIDENCY,

LEGAL

AND

JUDICIAL

REFORM:

53 (2003), available at http://www4.worldbank.org/legal/legalr/

GreyBookFina12003.pdf.
Id. at 52.
33.
For example, the Bank deploys different regulatory arguments, and exhibits differ34.
ent categories of regulatory concerns in the area of financial regulation than it does in respect
of either environmental or labor regulation. See RITTICH, supra note 8.
WORLD BANK, supra note 11. See also the definition of structural reforms in IMF,
35.
supra note 29.
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growth.36 The second is that market reform and development policies
have themselves produced undesirable social outcomes, either in the aggregate or for particular groups such as workers37 or women." These

concerns are often articulated in the framework of human rights: either
they are failures to attend adequately to human rights or are themselves
breaches of human rights. 9 In addition, there seems to be evidence that
market reforms and the upheavals associated with economic integration
can provoke or exacerbate social conflict, especially in ethnically divided societies.' Both critiques gained traction, however, from a third
concern, one rooted in a fundamental ordering principle of international
law and institutions, namely sovereignty. This concern is simply that,
however well motivated and to whatever economic effect, the constraints
placed upon States by the conditionalities attached to loans were deeply
invasive of sovereign power and democratic political priorities. Indeed,
reforms raised fundamental questions about the legitimacy of the IFI's
policy-based lending and the extent to which the institutions had mandates to intervene in the internal policy decisions of states. 1
For the most part, the criticisms of first generation reforms did not
focus on the legal framework of development or the broader governance
agenda as such. Instead they were largely concerned with macroeconomic policies and their effects upon either specific groups or societies
at large. 42 Despite the fact that their concerns intersected and sometimes
directly overlapped with those who were alert to the questions of sovereignty and the distribution of power between the developed and
developing world, many advocates of greater attention to the social side
36.
This was a major focus of the United Nations Summit for Social Development in
1995. See Report of the World Summit on Social Development, 14th plen. Mtg. at 4, U.N.Doc.
A/CONF. 166/9 (1995). It remains a live concern among some of the international institutions.
See ILO, A FAIR GLOBALIZATION: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES FOR ALL (2004), available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/wcsdg/index.htm.
37.
Guy STANDING, GLOBAL LABOUR FLEXIBILITY: SEEKING DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
(1999).
38.
Diane Elson & Nilufer Cagatay, The Social Content of Macroeconomic Policies,
28:7 WORLD DEV. 1347 (2000).
39.
See Report of the World Summit for Social Development, supra note 36; See also
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saw little to question or object to, and much to commend, in the whole
idea of good governance. This is true afortioriin the context of second
generation reforms, now that good governance has come to encompass
human rights. The decision to bracket the legal framework of development or simply to assume that good governance lives up to its advance
billing and can be treated as co-extensive with promoting the social side
of the agenda may be a mistake, 43 however, or at the least a matter that
now needs to be addressed.
The significance of good governance and legal reform to development is conventionally attributed to their roles in enhancing the security
of entitlements and the efficiency of economic transactions and their importance to the overall political and economic climate in which stable
investment and human development occur." In order to locate the role of
law in social and distributive justice, however, as well as the democratization of development and market reform, legal rules and institutions
need to be analyzed in a number of other modes as well. This is a complex and multifaceted topic; here I want only to signal those connections
that seem to be most salient to the social agenda and the objectives of
democratization.
The first is the discursive or ideological: claims about the rule of law
and the nature and content of good governance can be used to legitimate
attention to particular social objectives such as human rights or gender
equality. But they can also be used to alternatively normalize or delegitimatize their legal or institutional expression or the frame in which
they are pursued. Both on the ground and in the wider international context, such claims may make it alternatively easier or more difficult to
secure support for particular reforms. This may be either beneficial or
detrimental; it may also function to empower some groups at the expense
of others, whether local, foreign, or some mixture of both.
This links to the second mode, the distributive: because legal rules
and institutions constitute an important means of allocating power and
resources to different social groups, the form and content of legal reforms can be crucially important to the question of who benefits and
who loses in the course of reforms. The fact that they may be instituted
to enhance competitiveness or address market failures does not change
this. The manner in which reforms actually play out on the ground will
undoubtedly vary, some times considerably, because of pre-existing institutions and path dependence; because they will inevitably engender
Social justice critics have often avoided deep engagement with questions of market
43.
design. A variety of factors is surely in play: division of labor along disciplinary lines; discomfort with the language and analytic tools of economists; and a tendency to rely on human
rights and constitutional norms as the vehicles of transformative legal and political change.
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44.
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resistance as well as compliance from those whose behavior they are
intended to regulate; because different groups will be differentially positioned to deploy the entitlements that they are allocated; because reforms
are destined to intersect with a wide range of other normative orders,
whether legal, social or cultural; and because the process of adjudication
sometimes alters, or even subverts, the initial valence of reforms. Even if
these complexities make it difficult to project the economic effects of
reforms-whether aggregate or distributive-with complete accuracy, it
also seems true that structural reforms are clearly relevant to a host of
social concerns, many of which are either closely connected to or directly about the distribution of resources and power. Thus, tracking the
trajectory of legal and institutional reforms remains important to understanding the rising and falling fortunes of different groups and the fate of
social goals.
The third is the constitutive. Legal rules and institutions play a role
in (re)constructing the very subjects and activities that they are often
imagined to merely regulate. This is occasionally recognized in current
development literature, particularly when, as in the references to "rule of
law" respecting societies, this process of reconstruction is regarded as
uncontroversially good. If legal rules and institutions are inside, rather
than outside, social and economic practices, however, it seems important
to consider that ideas about good governance and best practice in law
and policy may themselves be implicated in the reformulation of social
goals that seems to be emerging in tandem with second generation reforms. They are also likely to be implicated in defining the range of
democratic options available to both states and communities. It is also
worth observing, that private law rules serve a political as well as an
economic function; property, for example, has long been identified as a
delegation of sovereignty. 45 Thus, quite apart from their distributive effects, the effort to normalize a particular structure of private rights and to
confine regulatory interventions by the State will likely affect the scope
of sovereign power and the extent of democratic control at the national
and local levels.46
These observations suggest that legal reforms might provoke or enable a variety of transformations beyond their explicit purposes.
Moreover, reforms might work at cross-purposes, rather than in a clear
or unitary direction; goals advanced at one level may be modified or
subverted at another. Whether the idea is to assess the prospects for real-
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izing social objectives or merely the economic objectives, a more nuanced idea of law seems in order.
Given the centrality of legal reforms to the overall development
agenda and the multiple modes and registers-ideological, distributive,
constitutive, regulatory, normative-in which they resonate and operate,
it seems unlikely that good governance and legal and institutional matters could be entirely separate from the realization of social objectives.
Legal rules and institutions constitute the frame in which social objectives are pursued; they are part of the structure by which risk, reward and
responsibility are established. As such, they function as a key transfer
point between the two sides of the development agenda. Regulatory and
policy prescriptions fill out the content of general objectives, illuminating the contours of both the economic and social sides of the
development project. They also disclose a great deal about how different
objectives are intended to co-exist; for example, they may represent an
expression of the balance that is struck between distributive and efficiency concerns. Although much of the relationship between social
objectives and the legal and institutional frame of development has been
held in abeyance up to this point, it seems difficult to avoid confronting
it directly once the social dimension of development is in play.
III. LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN SECOND GENERATION
REFORMS: CHANGE AND STASIS

Due to the focus on institutions, law had already come to play an
important role in the reform agenda prior to the introduction of second
generation reforms. Arguments from law had been consistently deployed
to support market reform since the IFIs became immersed in the institutional reconstruction occasioned by the transition to markets in Central
and Eastern Europe and the CI5 47 ; as a result, the discourse of best practices in law had been under active construction since the early to mid1990s. Both ideas about the nature of law in the abstract and claims
about necessary legal rules and institutions in market societies continue
to play a central role in second generation reforms, as they did in the
first. Whether it is the importance of the rule of law or the connection
4' 8
between property rights and security and political stability, theories and
arguments about law are woven throughout the governance project, helping to justify the choices and decisions that are made.
47.
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48.
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With second generation reforms, however, the IFIs have become interested in new modes of governance and begun to explore an expanded
set of regulatory options; this turn is especially marked with respect to
social concerns. Although causal relation is uncertain-either interest in
alternatives to traditional modes of regulation and governance may be
driving the approach to social issues or the pressure to address social
questions may itself be the catalyst for the interest in new modes of governance-the direction of change seems relatively clear. While the
pursuit of economic goals continues to attract a deep interest in questions of legal rules and institutional structure, the embrace of the social
coincides with a burgeoning interest in alternative modes of regulation
and an increasingly nuanced set of distinctions among norms and the
different modes and routes by which they can be pursued.
In the early discussions of law and development, the absence of formal law was typically represented as the absence of normativity and
regulation tout court, co-extensive with chaos, disorder, arbitrariness,
corruption-in short a Hobbesian state of nature. While the claim that
the rule of law and formal legal institutions are the sine qua non to development remains, it is just as common now to encounter arguments
that law is the problem: badly-crafted rules and policies, even the regulatory state as a whole, may be impediments to growth or otherwise
incompatible with the demands of a globally integrated economy. Hence,
the task is to import not just law, but the right set of institutions.
With second generation reforms, however, the IFIs seem to have
moved still further, beyond the point at which the goal is simply the
creation of law-based societies in which sovereign control of territory is
even and complete; there are no disjunctures between regulatory space
and regulatory power; there are no serious gaps between regulatory objectives and the law in action; and the legal system operates seamlessly
and without competition in the interests of progress and growth. Despite
its centrality to securing the right climate for investment, the IFIs no
longer necessarily assume that effective power resides in the State in a
transnational world of commerce and production, nor are they confident
that standard regulatory institutions will generate solutions to the problems of the post-industrial economy. Instead, a new regulatory paradigm
may be needed; sometimes law may even be irrelevant. Hence, sometimes the role of formal law is refashioned and carved back, as
governance projects demote both law and the State, or privilege it in defined forms such as private law and specific locales such as commercial
regulation.
In the process, more space is created for private actors to devise their
own normative regimes and alternative modes of securing compliance

Fall 2004]

The Future of Law and Development

are encouraged. Arbitration, for example, may be promoted over adjudication, similarly consultation and cooperation among the affected actors
may be preferred to regulation. For concerns such as human rights, labor
standards, gender equality and environmental issues, alternative modes
of governance are especially popular: soft law is preferred over hard;
frameworks, voluntary solutions, and market incentives promoted rather
than rules and regulation; and negotiated compliance preferred over
strict enforcement of rules and standards. In the alternative, these issues
may simply be relegated to the domain of policy, where policy is understood as distinct from and subordinate to rules and institutions.
Thus, the legal reform agenda in second generation reforms is
marked by both change and stasis. The argument here is that, because
there is such a range of claims and logics informing the discussions of
law, governance, norm generation, and because they seem to be loosely
associated with different issues, attention to both the change and the stasis is critical to understanding the direction of the social agenda and the
prospects for transformation.
A. Change
In second generation reforms, change is clearly visible in the following interconnected areas: 1) legal restraints upon the powers of the State;
2) greater emphasis on judicial process and institutions; 3) expansion of
the actors engaged in governance; 4) the turn toward soft law; 5) the recognition of non-legal sources of normativity; and 6) the use of human
rights. All mark a shift toward a much more fragmented and polycentric
normative order, one in which the center of gravity in respect of governance and regulation is no longer always located in the State.
1. Legal Restraints upon the Power of the State
Because concepts such as good governance are full of history and
content, but also contestable and unstable, an ongoing effort is required
to manage the direction of legal and policy reform. One problem is that
whatever hold market-friendly rules, policies and institutions have in any
jurisdiction, they remain vulnerable to challenge due to political pressure
and regime change. There remains the possibility, present in both authoritarian and democratic regimes, that political authorities might make
decisions that are suboptimal or disruptive from the standpoint of furthering investment and growth. Their capacity to do so is variably
explained as evidence of corruption, arbitrariness in the exercise of
power, the persistent vulnerability of the State to capture, or lack of
credible commitment-in short, the malfunction or dysfunction of the
State in some way.
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One of the ways that these concerns play out is in efforts to decommission the political arms of the State in an expanding zone of policy
and regulatory activities. The motivation is to bind the State into the future so that reforms agreed to at one point in time with one
administration cannot be undone, at least without considerable expense
and effort, at a later date. The Bank has now concluded that the answer
to the problem of states credibly committing to "good" policies may be
the delegation of a range of functions typically associated with the State
to either independent agencies or external, international institutions. Taking a cue from the independence of central banks, the Bank proposes
that tasks such as tax collection and trade policy might be taken out of
the political or legislative arena as well.49
These proposals track the trend toward the constitutionalization of
international economic reforms; efforts to obtain regulatory precommitment from states regarding investor rights are already welldescribed in the international literature. While limits on state power are
hardly new-restraints upon state power are a familiar part of all rulesbased regimes and form the basis for constitutional oversight of the State-their traditional justification lies in the potential that the State
might use its disproportionate power to oppress individuals and vulnerable groups. The logic of constitutional restraint has already been
extended to non-natural persons such as corporations; what is noteworthy about the evolution of the governance agenda in second generation
reforms is the increasing tendency to tightly circumscribe the political
choices of democratic electorates as well.
Such proposals represent an important moment in the struggle between governance norms and sovereignty and democracy, if only for the
reason there is no necessary limit to the application of the principle of
credible commitment; it might be argued that states should commit on a
broad range of issues, social issues included. But whether they actually
extend this far, restraints such as those described above are likely to have
important implications for the pursuit of social initiatives. For example,
States that are vulnerable to investor suits for regulatory takings may
experience regulatory chill in areas such as environmental or health and
safety issues.5 It is now evident that even purely economic commitments
can affect the scope for responding to social issues, especially those that
49.
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have resource implications (which is to say almost all of them). For this
reason, States within the European Union have discovered that a monetary union quickly moves toward a fiscal union too, and that fiscal
of social objectives, if not the
constraints quite directly affect the pursuit
52
fabric of the social state in its entirety.
2. Judicial Reforms
While the interest in this issue can be traced back before second
generation reforms, there has been an astonishing proliferation of judicial reform projects in recent years; to date, the Bank has embarked on
over 600 projects. 3 Judicial reforms encompass alterations to judicial
institutions and training, as well as an enhanced focus on process, procedure, and access to justice; they may involve supply side reforms, such
as anti-corruption efforts and reforms to judicial institutions, or demand
side access to justice reforms.54
Some of the time, judicial reforms appear to be driven by efforts to
improve the position of marginalized groups. So far supply-side concerns appear to have dominated the funding process, however. While
recently there have been more access to justice projects that target specific groups such as women, 55 whether they might become a central
rather than peripheral concern is unclear. At this point, much of the interest in judicial reform is clearly linked to the old goals of facilitating
transactions and securing property and contract rights. Judicial reform
has become a major part of the effort to promote the rule of law and secure a stable investment climate: the presence of institutions capable of
enforcing property and contract rights and the appropriate attitude of
judges to the adjudication of conflicting rights are both crucial if reforms
are to realize their potential.56
3. New Actors
A hallmark of second generation reforms, particularly since 2002, is
the effort to take account of the way in which governance is dispersed
across society rather than centered in the State.57 Not only does the Bank
The recent rejection of the Euro on the part of Sweden, for example, is widely at52.
tributed to fears that the monetary union would jeopardize its welfare state.
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recognize that regulation occurs in multiple sites, however; reform prescription actively seeks to displace governance to different sites and to
empower a range of regulatory actors other than the State. Thus, more
and more of the regulatory projects conventionally assumed by the State
are being allocated to actors in the "third sector." The market and market
actors, more particularly investors and capital holders, are becoming important sources of law, normativity, rule, and control.
It has been recognized at least since the mid-1990s that market actors can be an important source of demand for "good law.'58 Within the
Bank, this is normally imagined as an uncomplicated relationship. There
may be those who, seeking protection from the challenges of globalization, make demands that, if acceded to, would distort the market.
Workers, for example, are often identified as a special interest group;59
women too may seek protections or rules that deviate from market norms
and introduce inefficiencies. 6° But such exceptions aside, the demand
that market actors create for law is normally treated as simply coextensive with the production of the framework conditions for growth.
There is also evidence of the "third sectorization" of law and policy,
however, as there is of development and market reform as a whole. This
has complicated the regulatory logic around development. No longer do
policy debates revolve solely around the State and the market, although
this relationship remains a central preoccupation. Moving from the margins closer to the center of the good governance debates is a host of
actors that make up the third sector. The third sector comprises myriad
non-state, non-market, civil society organizations such as voluntary associations, NGOs, and religious organizations who are now invited,
indeed expected, to play a greater role in public life. Like the market,
they too may serve not only as service providers or partners in public/private ventures or as sources of valuable social capital;6 ' they are
also sources of demand for institutional change. For example, they may
serve as useful vehicles of resistance to the State, particularly where the
State is pursuing policies that contravene conventional wisdom on good
governance. They may also serve as conduits of information and democratic preferences to policy makers, a role they may play in competition
58.
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with or even in lieu of political institutions. They are sometimes also
recognized as independent sources of normative authority
The third sector also functions as a repository of concerns that are
properly excluded from the law and the State, however. Sometimes the
intransigence of culture or society is invoked as a brake on expectations
around social change and a ground for regulatory non-intervention on
the part of the State. For example, if a problem such as gender inequality
lies in cultural norms, legal and institutional remedies may be futile. Instead, social change beyond the realm of the State is needed.62
4. Soft Law
Despite the belief that the fundamental institutional architecture of
development is now well settled and due to ongoing concerns about government failure, a desire to confine the role of the State, one place where
development is clearly visible is in the use area of soft norms and institutional processes. There is increasing reliance upon voluntary initiatives,
incentives, and standards generated at the local level or by the parties
most directly affected; this is particularly the case in respect to issues
typically consigned to the social rather than the hard economic side of
the ledger.6' For example, while the IFIs remain deeply committed to the
idea that the formalization of property and contract rights is required to
facilitate investment, production, and exchange, 64 they often propose soft
norms and strategies to deal with any social concerns associated with
these activities. For example, corporate codes of conduct to further human rights, labor standards, and environmental protection are classic
alternative regulatory initiatives that currently find favor. This turn to
soft law is not unpredictable; indeed, it is consistent with the established
view that regulatory initiatives for distributive purposes are likely to impede efficiency and the ongoing concerns about regulatory intervention
even where some form of regulation might be indicated.
5. Non-Legal Normativity: Informal Norms,
Social Networks, and Culture
In a related turn, one of the most important elements of second generation reforms is the attention that is beginning to be given to non-legal
sources of normativity and the effort to take account of local practices
and norms, especially those emanating from market actors and civil
supra note 11.
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society groups. One effect is to expand the reach of good governance
beyond formal law, into the interstices of societies and cultures. While
the phenomenon of legal pluralism and its impact on and importance to
the operation of formal legal institutions has long been noted in the legal
literature, 66 the turn outside of formal institutions marks a significant
shift in the regulatory approach of the IFIs. While the justification for
formal law remains centered around its role in attracting investment and
promoting growth, culture and society have now been partially rehabilitated and there is new interest in the role of informal norms in furthering
efficiency as well as growth. Moreover, the discourse is around law becoming more complex, as at least some of the anti-formalist critiques
have been absorbed.
Rather than the antithesis of law, now informal norms may supplement or even supplant formal law in the facilitation of business
transactions. Although the rhetoric of corruption remains as strong as
ever, 67 the Bank has come around to the view that social networks can be
an efficient way to close deals and convey information, even though they
have tendencies to function as insider-networks. They may be especially
critical for the poor for whom formal law is often unavailable. In addition, such networks spread risk and raise the relative returns from market
transactions, which they do by defining property and contract rights and
managing competition. 6' These are, of course, precisely the same arguments that are advanced for formal law, although the arguments for the
formalization of law are rooted in the inherent limits of societies governed by culture and convention.69
What is perhaps most interesting is the view that civil society and
the third sector also have a role in responding to market failure. While
market failures are one of the classic bases for state intervention, the
Bank is now of the view that non-state bodies may be able to substitute,
providing solutions to such problems in at least some cases. Part of their
attraction lies in the fact that they represent an alternative to the State, a
means of avoiding a return to old style, top-down regulation. Yet reliance
on civil society also produces countervailing worries. For example, informal norms may serve multiple objectives rather than efficiency
66.
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simpliciter; in particular, informal laws and norms may reflect distributive concerns." Nonetheless, the extra-legal has clearly been
acknowledged to some extent as a source of regulatory authority and
efficiency, at least for those who do not circulate in the realm of global
capital.
6. Human Rights
Human rights make a significant appearance throughout the second
generation reform literature. There are countless references to the need
for basic human rights such as freedom of expression and freedom of
including the freedom to establish non-governmental entiassociation,
• 71
ties ; anti-discrimination norms too now make a regular appearance.
The IFIs have embraced human rights as part of the reformulated
definition of development on a number of grounds: because they are now
an official end of development; because they contribute directly to good
economic outcomes; because they protect the interests of civil society
groups and serve as a counterweight to the power of the State; and because they form part of the political climate necessary to attract
investment and ensure growth. Thus, human rights serve both economic
and social purposes. For example, freedom of association may be necessary to empower civil society groups vis-A-vis the State, while antidiscrimination norms serve to increase market access and participation
for excluded or disadvantaged groups, something that is expected to enhance economic growth as well as social inclusion.
The recognition of human rights is highly significant, in part because
human rights often structure the debate on issues ranging from gender
equality and global labor standards to the protection of indigenous peoples and the environment. Progressive reformers, too, not only endorse
human rights as ends in themselves; they also frame their arguments for
change to development reforms and practices in the language of human
rights, hoping that the moral heft provided by the framework of human
rights will help to overcome arguments and resistance they otherwise
encounter.
Sometimes human rights do seem to represent a point of intersection
between the two sides, a common way to frame the wider social agenda.
For example, basic education and health care at least occasionally are
described by Bank officials as "rights to which people are entitled and
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should have the ability to assert".72 It is important, however, to recognize
that references to human rights within development and market reform
policies are not necessarily references to human rights as they are understood by the international human rights institutions, human rights
scholars, the activist community or the wider civil society. Rather, they
are inevitably references to only a limited domain of human rights, typically identified as basic human rights. While access to basic health care
and education may sometimes be described as a right, in general the IFIs
speak the language of human rights only in regard to civil and political
rights. As described above, there is support for freedom of expression,
religion and association; arguably some of the access to justice initiatives
could be subsumed under the framework of human rights too, especially
those that target women or other marginalized or excluded groups. The
IFIs also endorse equality, as formal anti-discrimination norms are
viewed as fundamental to societies organized around market participation.
But what is excluded, left behind in the process of importing human
rights into development, is also telling. Apart from the protection of
property and contract rights, the rules, institutions, policies and practices
that organize the economy, work and production do not generally fall
within the normative framework of human rights; this remains the case
even when they appear to be essential to the realization of objectives that
are recognized as human rights, such as gender equality or core labor
rights. As described next, any assumption on the part of reformers that
acceptance of the formal right entails agreement about its concrete institutional, financial or other implications is unsafe.
There may be a sizable gap between the endorsement of human
rights on the one hand and legal recognition and institutional entrenchment of those rights on the other in any event. While human rights may
have been accepted at the normative level, it is unsafe to assume that this
recognition has any necessary or determinate impact upon the design of
institutions and legal rules. For example, despite the formal acknowledgement of freedom of association and core labor rights for workers as
human rights, the IFIs continue to resist the implementation of labor market rules and institutions that facilitate collective bargaining in the face of
employer intransigence or protect workers from reprisals from union organizing and respect for workers' freedom of association. 73 Despite the
72.
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general endorsement of gender equality, there is similar resistance, both
normative and instrumental, to a host of well-entrenched proposals to
promote gender equality.74 In short, there is selective engagement with
both human rights norms and their institutional implications, at least as
those implications are understood in other constituencies.
For related reasons, there is also resistance to the idea of endorsing a
rights-based approach to development tout court. The campaign for
rights-based development is an effort to get the IFIs, and a wide range of
other actors and institutions both global and local, to recognize a number
of rights to which people are entitled and which they would have the
75
ability to assert in the context of development. Those calling for rightsbased development typically seek to subject the entire range of development and market reform policies to an overarching set of human rights
and public and international law norms. This includes a range of market
reform policies that human rights and social justice activists have identified as inimical to the advancement or protection of human rights, social
rights in particular, such as: fiscal austerity drives that limit the resources
for health, education and other social services; macroeconomic and
monetary policies that increase unemployment and aggravate the plight
of the poor; and liberalization and deregulation policies that shift the
balance of power among social actors domestic and foreign and increase
inequality both within and among states. So far, the Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Fund) have decisively resisted this move, not
because they object to human rights per se but on the basis that they
have no mandate to endorse development policies that do not demonstrably lead to and may in their view actually impair economic growth.
But they go still further, arguing that economic growth is itself necessary
for human rights, thus subverting the argument that development and
market reform projects should automatically be subordinated to human
rights norms.
B. Stasis
The new approaches to governance and norm generation in connection with social objectives and the complexities that are visible in the
encounter with human rights are difficult to account for on their own
terms. They do seem connected to the stasis in the larger legal and institutional reform agenda, however.
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 157 (The International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration
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Despite the redefinition of the aims of development and market reform; the central role assigned to law in second generation reforms,
efforts to increase the country ownership of reforms, and some alterations to the processes by which reforms are implemented as a result, the
actual content of the legal reform agenda has changed surprisingly little.
Discussion and policy prescription on the rules and institutions that are
needed for development remain centered around concerns about the
promotion of efficiency and competition through the protection of property and contract rights.76 At the same time, corruption, transparency and
accountability remain the major preoccupations in respect of the State.
As a result, the fact that the development agenda has been reformulated
to include the social is almost completely unreflected in the core legal
and institutional reform project.
Although one of the touchstones of second generation reforms is the
rejection of a one-size-fits-all template for development and the importance of wider participation in the formulation of development goals,
there is surprisingly little diversity in either the discourse or the prescriptions about the legal reforms needed for development. In part this may
be due to how the process of participation is itself imagined. As one recent Bank publication put it, enhancing participation involves first
diagnosing the problem and then designing reforms according to the
relevant known best practices; at this point, it becomes important to get
local buy-in as to priorities and sequencing.77 Despite the reminders that
context matters, there is no evident pluralization in the reform proposals.
Whether one-size-fits-all, especially with respect to economic rules and
regulations, still seems to be a matter of internal dispute within the
Bank.7 ' But even if it no longer still rules at the formal level, then its impact is yet to cash out in any visible way.
The resulting disjuncture between the expanded development agenda
and the legal reform project is stark. There is a wealth of empirical research exploring the connection between the existing best practice rules
and growth; indeed second generation reforms are marked by an intensified focus on measuring the results of reforms and shoring up the
empirical base of the reform agenda. 79 Research and policy reports also
increasingly suggest a congruence or overlap between the institutional
76.
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demands of social justice and economic growth. But research on the
distributive or other social effects of the legal reform agenda itself is
sparing to non-existent.
The result is a wall between the two sides of the development
agenda, the effect of which is to make the established legal framework
the background condition in which other objectives, including social objectives, must be pursued. It is as if the legal framework of investment,
production and exchange had no effect on the social and, aside from the
changes described above, the incorporation of social objectives into the
development agenda had few necessary institutional implications. Yet
whatever the promise of procedural reforms, it is not only lack of popular participation in the development and market reform process that has
attracted concern. Nor has the social deficit necessarily been attributed to
the absence of the rule of law, inadequate legal process or procedure, or
lack of access to judicial institutions. Rather, much of the criticism concerns the values and interests that have been furthered and neglected in
the process of reform and the groups that have been alternatively harmed
or advantaged in the process.
Because of the varied properties and effects of legal reforms de-.
scribed at the outset, these concerns seem likely to be intimately related
to, rather than separate from, the institutional choices that have governed
the development and economic integration agendas. Apart from a nod in
the direction of civil and political rights, however, the discussion of legal
rules and institutions still largely proceeds in terms of their expected
contribution to efficiency. A vast number of legal rules and institutions in
contemporary market societies are of course expressly designed to further distributive and social goals: collective bargaining rules, consumer
protection laws, landlord and tenant laws, and zoning laws all re-allocate
the bargaining power that would otherwise be obtained through contract
and property law. They may also guarantee social minima, whether in
respect of housing, health and safety, employment or other concerns. But
is doubtful whether the structure and content of other laws, not only
those that obviously further social objectives but those that further efficient transactions too, can be explained apart from the conflicting
interests and concerns of different constituencies. Despite the expansion
of development objectives to include the social, there is no explanation
for rules that deviate from efficiency other than that the regulatory process has been captured by special interests.
What is missing, is any recognition that the legal and institutional reform projects may be implicated in some of the very social problems that
they are now being conscripted to help solve because of their effect on
80.
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the allocation of power and resources. Yet while their connection to social concerns seems to be absent, there is some degree of consciousness
that distributive struggles may be played out in and around legal rules.
For example, in a recent restatement on the relationship of law to development, the Bank makes reference to the fact that legal rules
"determin[e] who gets what and when" and notes that "all institutional
structures affect the distributionof assets, incomes, and costs as well as
the incentives of market participants and the efficiency of market transactions. ' ' 8 This insight, however, is largely deployed to confirm the
distinction between good and bad law and the wisdom of the established
path of reform: "By distributing rights to the most efficient agent, institutions can enhance productivity and growth. 82 Similarly, a recent Fund
report on the political economy of structural reforms analyzes the phenomenon of status quo bias,83 described as the tendency of potential
losers to hold up the process of regulatory reforms. This insight, however, does not provoke a more general reflection on the fact that winners
and losers are routinely produced in the course of reforms.
In addition, it seems likely that some reassessment of the legal reform project may be needed expressly for the purposes of furthering the
social side of the development agenda. Efforts to improve the position of
groups such as workers, women and indigenous peoples, or simply to
alleviate the hardship of those who are generally dispossessed, do not
always live comfortably with efforts to facilitate transactions and provide
a market-friendly investment environment. While greater equality may
be entirely compatible with growth, 84 typically there are real and perceived tradeoffs. And even if greater attention to inequality and other
social objectives does also aid growth, there can still be critical disputes
about the manner and extent to which they should be addressed through
legal rules and institutions. This is a particularly live possibility in second generation reforms, as many of the routes by which social objectives
either might be pursued or traditionally have been pursued conflict with
the norms and assumptions that organize good governance. For all of
these reasons, we might expect the introduction of social concerns to
engender both contestation and change in the realm of governance and
legal reform.
There are at least three ways in which the governance frame itself
might be affected by the pursuit of social objectives. The first, and most
81.
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obvious, is that incorporation of social concerns raises the possibility of
reliance upon the regulatory, redistributive state. As described below, a
central thrust of the governance agenda is to promote and legitimate a
shift from the Keynesian or New Deal to the enabling or post-regulatory
state. 85 The incorporation of the social might also call into question the
adequacy of a legal and institutional order organized primarily around
the promotion of efficiency and competition. For example, attention to
gender and other forms of equality might compel a re-examination of the
assumption that markets adequately value human capital and contributions to economic growth 86; it might also revive attention to the
distributive properties of background rules and institutions in households
and families, civil society, and the market. But attention to social concerns might also provoke a reconsideration of the nature of efficient
markets and their institutional foundations. For example, it may turn out
that a serious examination of labor and workplace equality issues also
of the current decasts doubt on the assumptions about the efficiency
87
regulatory approaches to labor market institutions.
All though it seems unlikely that this is the final word, so far none of
these possibilities is much in evidence. Instead, there are clear efforts to
manage the institutional implications of the expanded development
agenda by confining the growth and direction of formal legal entitlements and relying upon new forms of governance; by fashioning a new
social role for the State; and by channeling many social concerns away
from the State toward non-state actors and institutions. The end result are
social agendas that do not seriously disturb the established institutional
and regulatory frame and that sometimes circumvent formal institutional
solutions altogether.
One possible explanation is that the core reforms from the first generation are regarded as entirely compatible with enhanced attention to
the social side; as the President of the Bank announced in 1999, what is
88
required is simply more attention to the other side of the agenda. Another possibility is that core reforms are thought to be not only
compatible but necessary to the realization of social objectives. This too,
has some resonance in current development discourse: as the Bank and
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the Fund have become fond of saying, not only does development now
include human rights, the realization of human rights requires economic
development. 9 Indeed, it has been argued that deficits, inflation, subsidies and trade restrictions are themselves contrary to human rights. 90 Yet
a third possibility is that core legal reforms themselves directly embody
or promote social objectives, even if we never realized it before. This too
forms part of the current development narrative: where before property
rights were defended in the name of attracting investment and economic
growth, now we learn that they are in fact of most benefit and importance to the poor and critical to the direct alleviation of poverty as well. 9'
Whatever the explanation, attention to the social side of development
proceeds largely through pre-existing legal institutions or outside them
altogether.
IV. ASSESSING

THE RISE OF THE SOCIAL

A. Transforming the Social
The discussion of social concerns in the context of second generation reforms suggests that addressing social concerns require the
following shifts. It entails more emphasis on human rights; an enhanced
focus on process and procedure; greater attention to popular participation in the formulation of development policy. It may also involve
alterations to policy and resource re-allocations to encourage investment
in human capital and enable more highly-skilled, highly-valued market
participation. It almost certainly involves greater involvement of civil
society, NGOs, and grassroots groups, whether in the formulation of
norms or the delivery of services. This is turn may imply more volunteer
work, especially in the context of fiscal constraints or the devolution of
state responsibilities to the local level. But it also involves a cultural or
psychological shift, namely becoming more alive to the possibilities of
the market and moving beyond the expectation that the State is either the
source or the guarantor of social entitlements.
An important part of furthering the social side centers around ensuring broad participation in the market, however, which the Ins are
promoting through a variety of what might be described as "marketcentered" agendas for social justice.92 These are projects that respond to
89.
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92.
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93
issues ranging from gender equality to improved corporate social re9'
sponsibility and better labor standards in the new economy, largely by
relying upon market forces and market incentives. What both joins them
together and distinguishes them from other social justice projects is that
they present the pursuit of social objectives as essentially congruent and
coterminous with the current direction of institutional reform, if only
they are approached in the right spirit and with a proper consciousness of
governance norms.
While these efforts often collapse the distance and conflict between
economic growth and social objectives that marked first generation reforms, they also reframe social objectives in ways that make them more
compatible with market-centered growth.
At this point, many of these projects can at best be described as
speculative. But whatever the prospects that they will actually realize
their objectives, their impact upon the social goals themselves is significant.
Among the results are that the object and scope of social goals are
being reduced. For example, formal equality, especially in the form of
participation rights, is being substituted for substantive equality. Social
programs are being targeted to assist only the poorest rather than provide
universal or broad-based protection.
These trends are evident in the Bank's policy research report on
gender equality. In this report, the Bank sets out the case for incorporating gender equality into the development agenda, explaining it as "good
for growth" while at the same time defending development as good for
gender equality. 95 In the process, however, the report advances a particular definition of gender equality that explicitly rejects the goal of
substantive economic equality between men and women, even as it promotes market processes and greater market participation as the engines
of gender equality. 96 A similar process is at work with respect to global
labor standards. When the Bank and the Fund are pressed to recognize
certain core worker rights as human rights, they give a qualified endorsement, explicitly reserving their position on what the International
Labor Organization (ILO) identifies as the linchpin of the global labor
97
agenda, freedom of association and the right to bargain collectively. But
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just as important is that they are also reformulating the basic objectives
of worker protection: according to the Bank and the Fund, the goal is not
to secure the traditional collective interests of workers; this may amount
to special interest protection. 9' Instead, what is important is that workers'
individual rights and freedoms are respected. In their view, the economic
security and welfare of workers lies not in job security protection or
other labor and employment standards, but in greater flexibility and
adaptability to the demands of the market.
The IFIs are also altering the mechanisms through which social objectives are achieved. While this was arguably implicit in first generation
reforms, with the new attention to the social side of the agenda, the limits on those objectives are now becoming more explicit. In particular, the
strategies of engagement with social concerns resist the use of market
rules and institutions for distributive purposes on the basis that they can
be expected to have a depressing effect on aggregate growth; similar arguments are advanced for restraining the use of tax and income transfers.
These developments all indicate a growing instrumentalization of
social justice claims. Social objectives are embraced not only because
they are human rights or are socially desirable, but because they enhance
growth. Although with second generation reforms at least some social
justice issues now have status as independent ends or goals of development, debates over social justice are increasingly conducted in terms of
their contribution to economic growth. 99 Social goals are themselves being re-ranked: those that appear to most directly enhance the extent and
quality of market participation, for example investments in human capital, such as education and worker training, are preferred over those that
do not.
There is also a marked individualization of the social welfare calculus. Rather than common and universal entitlements in respect of
pensions and health care, market reformers propose the establishment of
individual accounts calibrated to levels of market participation. Furthermore, as described above, workers are increasingly represented
individuals with rights rather than constituencies with collective interests
and demands. '
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To repeat, in their efforts to propose solutions to the social, the IFIs
are as likely to reject as embrace the claims and evaluations of other international institutions, scholarly experts and civil society groups.
Whether they diverge from other norms or not, however, may matter less
than the simple fact that since the inception of second generation reforms, they have established an authoritative presence in such debates.
Whether the issue is gender equality, global labor standards or human
rights, the IFIs routinely stake out positions on the content of social and
political concerns and their policy and institutional implications.
The result is a "new normal", a reconstitution of norms at the level
of subject or citizen, social institutions and societies as a whole. Paradoxically, quintessential second generation ideas that there should be
self-determination in the development process and greater attention to
the social or human side of the development equation manage to coexist
with the view that there must be continued fidelity to market principles
and the institutions said to embody them. While there is a place for human rights, heightened attention to social concerns, and even some room
for equality, they are envisaged within a fairly well defined set of market-centered and market-promoting parameters.
At least part of the reason is not hard to intuit. The embrace of the social dimension of development risks rehabilitating goals and resuscitating
strategies that have been systematically challenged if not discredited outright in the broader governance agenda as a whole. To the extent that
responsiveness to social welfare and social justice concerns is reflexively
associated with intervention, regulation, protection or redistribution by the
State, the IFIs (along with many other international and domestic actors
and bodies) seek to break this connection.
Thus, one possibility is that efforts to promote the social are better
explained in conjunction with the governance agenda than in terms of
established ideas about human rights or the route to social justice themselves. There are two issues integral to governance norms that appear to
have had an impact on the way that social concerns are imagined in the
context of development. The first is the nature of sovereignty; the second
is the emergence of the enabling State.
B. RecalibratingSovereignty
Since its inception, policy-based lending has raised a fundamental
set of concerns around sovereignty, legitimacy and the limits of the mandates of the IFIs. The original aim behind policy-based lending was to
identify and isolate a set of regulatory and institutional issues from the
wider zone of political contestation, on the basis that this isolation from
"normal" politics was necessary to stabilize the economy and promote
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growth. These efforts produced resistance, much of which was articulated in terms of the infringement of democratic processes and sovereign
political priorities. The move to promote good governance, particularly
in dysfunctional or failed States, has not solved this problem, despite the
second generation idea that reforms should become more democratic and
participatory.
This is partly explained by the fact that the development of governance norms has been coextensive with the continuous erosion of the
prohibition on interference in the internal affairs of states. Distributive
concerns such as human rights and gender equality had long been characterized as political issues; as such, they originally fell outside the
realm of considerations that the IFIs were authorized to use as the basis
of lending decisions. '°' As policy-based lending expanded into a fullyfledged governance agenda, one whose promotion became not simply
normalized but central to the activities of the IFIs, the specter of the forbidden political loomed large. Faced squarely with the issue, however,
the IFIs simply redefined the existing boundary between economic and
political issues. Armed with an opinion issued by the Bank's legal counsel on its governance activities, °2 they proceeded to articulate a
comprehensive economic rationale for engagement with domestic policies and regulations, effectively ratifying the path of action on which
they had already embarked. If in the first phase of policy-based reforms,
sovereignty stood as a reproach to market reform initiatives but was
largely ignored, then over time sovereignty has simply been redefined. 03
What should be stressed is that the governance opinion, and the expansion into new policy, the regulatory and institutional terrain that it
purported to explain and authorize, is not only a significant marker in the
recalibration of sovereignty. It is also critical to the socialization of the
development project in two ways. First, it provided the conduit for the
incorporation of such issues into the development and market reform
agenda by establishing the principle that however otherwise political,
such activities did not fall outside the institutional mandate laid out in
the Articles of Agreement as long as they could be plausibly linked to
economic development. ' 04 By determining the parameters in which the
formerly excluded social and distributive issues could
be legitimately considered, however, it also helped determine thenow
place of such
101.
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concerns within the agenda and the language or frame in which they
would materialize. Arguments for greater attention to social issues would
be articulated in terms of their contribution to growth and they would be
measured in terms of their impact upon economic growth, failing or succeeding along that metric.
Thus, if one of the criticisms of the Washington Consensus was that
it invaded the sovereign domain of states and constrained the exercise of
democratic choices, the paradox of second generation reforms is that in
responding to the social deficit of the first, the development institutions
seem to have increased their reach. Second generation reforms proceed
in the name of democratizing the development process and returning it to
its subjects. With the acknowledgement of the social dimension of development and the effort to elaborate what it does and does not involve,
however, the IFIs have expanded the territory in which they operate and
generated governance norms that are arguably even more disciplinary
than their predecessors. This effectively places a still greater range of
issues and decisions beyond politics, producing a qualified and reduced
form of sovereignty.
C. Toward the Enabling State
Good governance, legal reform and rule of law projects might be
understood as an effort to establish, in comprehensive ways, the institutional parameters of normal markets and normal market societies. What
makes this a complex exercise, however, is that it is not simply a question of diffusing market norms to states that have failed to sufficiently
assimilate them. Rather, what is "normal" within market states is also
under active reconstruction, with settled elements of the established
normal under assault. In other words, projects of diffusion and transformation are simultaneously underway.
Second generation reforms consolidate a central element of the governance agenda, which is a fundamental reconfiguration of the place of
the State in society and a new division of labor among the State, the
market, the individual, and civil society in social life. It is difficult to
overstate the paradigm shift in relation to the State that underpins the
agenda as a whole. Arguably its most fundamental element, the linchpin
of the exercise, is the shift from the "protective" and "regulatory" state to
what might be described as the "enabling" state. With the shift to the
enabling state, the role of the State is to protect a limited set of private
rights and to create the framework conditions for the flourishing of markets. It is against this metric, rather than simply the respect for the rule
of law or the capacity to implement democratic preferences, that the
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"goodness" of governance and the competence of the State are now
measured.
With second generation reforms, the events and outcomes that the
State is expected to enable has expanded; rather than merely facilitate
economic transactions, now it must promote goals such as gender equality
and greater social inclusion too. As described above, however, market participation is itself now a primary vehicle for these ends: despite the
inclusion of the social and the commitment to expanded citizen participation in the development process, the conception of the State's role has not
fundamentally shifted.
The idea of the enabling state has clear implications for the democratic and participatory objectives. Part of what is at stake in the shift
from government to governance is a challenge to the singular authority
of the State in the generation of norms; now other actors are now clearly
involved in the process too. But the enabling state also already embodies
objectives, objectives that may limit the zone of democratic action. Because the enabling state confines or rules out many traditional Keynesian
or New Deal approaches to ensuring economic security and furthering
objectives such as social justice and cohesion, intensified market participation becomes a much more attractive, perhaps necessary, strategy for
addressing a wide range of social ills. Thus, it is not surprising that the
main plank of the social agenda, whether it concerns gender equality,
improving the position of workers in the global economy, or even the
general problem of poverty alleviation, is the market.
V. SECOND GENERATION REFORMS:
TRANSFORMATIVE POSSIBILITIES?

From a legal standpoint, the second generation reform agenda does
not look particularly new; indeed, the legal and institutional framework
of the ideal market economy seems remarkably unaltered by the inclusion of the social, structural, and human. Nor is it substantially altered
by the injunction that development should be democratized and rendered
more participatory; however these ideals are imagined, there is little evidence that they have penetrated to the level of institutional design. Even
the discourse around core legal reforms is largely unchanged, notwithstanding the new objectives that development now encompasses.
There are new references to human rights, freedom of expression
and associational rights in particular. There is also enhanced emphasis
on entitlements that secure or improve access to the market: while in first
generation reforms, such concerns revolved around investors, now they
extend to workers and women as well. Beyond this, however, few new
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legal entitlements appear to be envisioned for those left behind in first
generation reforms.
The legal and institutional agenda is also not obviously responsive to
the push to make market reform and development more democratic and
participatory. Instead of the product of political conflict and democratic
choice, in second generation reforms as in first, the legal and institutional frame of economic development stands largely outside the
democratic process, setting the parameters in which other decisions are
made. So even as the incorporation of social concerns seems to represent
progress or improvement on one level, the range of options through
which to address them is being constrained on another.
From another vantage point, however, the relative stasis and continuity in respect of legal entitlements and institutional forms and the change
that is visible elsewhere in second generation reforms is completely explicable. The IFIs may well be committed to human rights and social
goals. It is important, however, to understand that the protection of investor interests and the commitment to efficient legal rules and institutions
remains a major part, perhaps the major part, of their strategy to advance
greater social well-being and social justice. This is because of the longstanding argument advanced by the IFIs that the only real form of
poverty alleviation lies in growth. While in many quarters, better social
outcomes are fundamentally a distributive problem, for the IFIs they remain largely dependent upon drawing new participants into the market
and generating greater aggregate wealth.
But the interest in market incentives and alternative modes of regulation and norm-generation, through which to further social goals, seems
deeply connected to their views about the proper role of the State. Similarly, their resistance to traditional, state-centered modes of pursuing
social justice seems inseparable from their abiding belief that they cannot help but interfere with economic growth.
Three additional observations may be germane to the discussion.
First, it is worth noting that there are two projects simultaneously in
play: one is the generation of economic growth at the local and national
levels; the other is building the architecture of the global economy.
While the IFIs work tirelessly to suggest that these two projects are
necessarily congruent, if not joined at the hip, in a globally integrated
economy, it seems clear that they may diverge in normative or
institutional terms at least occasionally. Developed country concerns
such as increased market access may be important reform objectives,
even though they tend to be submerged in the official narrative about
poverty alleviation. Notwithstanding the efforts to link best practices in
law to greater economic growth, the institutional preoccupations of the
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IFIs and their resistance to alternative paths and proposals may be better
explained by their commitment to the second project than by their failure
to apprehend the costs and limits of conventional reforms in particular
contexts and locales.
Second, ascribing independent importance to law opens up the reform project to new objectives. This could clearly lead either to an
expanded list of legal entitlements and/or a reassessment of conventional
wisdom about the goals and functions of legal rules and institutions associated with development. This is a live possibility, especially in a
context of heightened attention to democratic participation and greater
emphasis on social concerns. This has not happened, however, suggesting that it is also possible that the emphasis on law for itself could serve
a conservative function, entrenching rather than destabilizing or subverting the institutional project associated with first generation reforms. This
is a judgment, rather than an argument that such a result is in anyway
entailed by invocations of the importance of the rule of law. But given
that considerable substantive content had already been embedded in the
legal reform project, one possibility is that elevating law's place in development agenda may simultaneously strengthen the current direction
of institutional reform.
Third, one of the results of the different iterations of the law and development movement is that there is now an archive of arguments about
the relationship between law and economic growth and an array of competing and conflicting justifications for legal reforms, all of which carry
some resonance at the discursive level. '°5 Because they are used in both
predictable and arbitrary ways, it is difficult to do more than suggest the
directions such arguments might take. As a consequence of the conclusion that governance activities can encompass anything that reasonably
bears on prospects for economic growth, the IFIs now have a series of
enabling arguments for focusing attention on issues of social and distributive justice. It is important, however, to recall that they retain two
basic limiting arguments from an earlier era. The first is that such issues
may be political; as such, they may fall outside the realm of factors that
the IFIs are authorized to consider in their lending decisions.10 6 Second,
the IFIs maintain that they have no independent, free-floating mandate to
act as human rights enforcers; they are strictly limited in their decisions
105.
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to considerations that demonstrably further economic development. As a
result, they are only able advance objectives such as human rights or
gender equality to the extent that they also contribute to economic
growth. These two arguments structure the engagement with human
rights, distributive concerns and other social justice claims. On the one
hand, the IFIs may invoke constitutional restrictions on interference in
political affairs to preclude responses to social, egalitarian or distributive
concerns, however desirable such responses might otherwise be. But on
the other hand, they also argue that their mandate to further economic
development requires reconsideration of standard regulatory and policy
approaches to social questions. It is this that accounts for the fact that
issues conceived elsewhere as matters of human, women's or workers'
rights are either missing from second generation reforms altogether or
have become the subject of soft non-regulatory initiatives rather than
entitlements backed by the State.
Second generation reforms appear to create common ground among
market reformers and their critics, as calls for the rule of law and human
rights all sound in the register of greater social justice. Clear conceptual
and normative differences around the social agenda are visible, however.
As they are absorbed into the development agenda, a range of social objectives are being disaggregated and fragmented, reinterpreted and
reorganized, repositioned both in relation to each other and to economic
objectives, or simply rejected, usually on the basis that they are inappropriate in market-centered societies.
There are also clear conflicts at the level of strategy. The conclusion
we are invited to draw by the IFIs is that the achievement of social objectives requires no necessary legal and institutional reforms apart from
those that are necessary for market societies to thrive in general; the corollary is that the governance and legal frame also has no adverse impact
upon the possibilities of achieving social objectives either. Here is an
important fault line. The protection of private rights and a correlative
disenchantment with the regulatory, protective and redistributive state
remain foundational to the governance agenda. Regulations that alter the
structure of private rights and resource reallocations through the welfare
state, however, have been the primary institutional means for furthering
social, egalitarian and distributive goals in non-kinship based societies
One possibility, the one that is implicit in second generation reforms,
is that to the extent that changes are required in the realm of governance,
the answer lies in non-regulatory, non-institutional solutions. Constituencies explicitly committed to social justice and progressive social change
are also increasingly interested in alternative, non-, or post-regulatory
modes of norm generation. The result is an important contemporary
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debate over soft law and its capacity to substitute for hard law and to effect
social change. Soft law initiatives may be preferred for a variety of reasons
other than simply an aversion to state-based regulation. For example, the
impossibility of reaching consensus on regulatory reform may push parties
to explore alternatives. Similarly, the diversity of pre-existing rules and
institutions may make regulatory harmonization or convergence unlikely
or simply unavailable. Or the solutions to problems may be so varied and
context sensitive that the most that would be desired are either process
norms and entitlements or general agreement about the direction of reforms. 10 7 Incentives and voluntary standards may be more effective in
some contexts than sanctions alone. Both goals and methods for reaching them may be unstable; for this reason, some explicitly endorse
rolling-rule regimes as the preferred mode of regulation in the contemporary context.' 8 In short, the diversity of pre-existing regulatory
regimes, the complexity of issues and the variability of adequate responses may militate in favor of a range of approaches to regulation and
norm generation rather than reliance upon traditional top-down modes of
regulation by the State. This suggests that there is no reason to assume
that progress on the social front will occur only in reliance upon the traditional regulatory instruments and practices of the State. Institutions
continue to matter, however, especially for distributive purposes.
1. Soft Law
One of the central questions is the interaction between the institutional structures that form the core of the legal reform agenda and the
soft strategies that seem to be a favored method to further social goals.
Soft law strategies may well be a strategy for transformative change in a
progressive direction. There is no particular reason, however, to assume
that they will have this effect, or that they will be the most effective
means of achieving such goals, especially in the face of competing
norms and incentives. Soft norms and processes, especially those that are
designed to address distributive questions in the market, operate within
and against a set of background rules and institutions in any event. Thus,
107.
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any evaluation of their prospects would need to take account of the effects of the broader regulatory context.
To query the power of soft norms is not to fetishize formal legal
rules. The idea that legal rules operate in the mechanical and functionalist manner imagined in much development discourse is surely a fantasy;
it remains equally mistaken when it comes from those on the left who
are concerned about the alleged defects of the current order and hope to
remedy those defects with other formal rules. There are myriad reasons,
from the presence of competing social and legal norms and the vagaries
of adjudication to the distribution of assets on the ground, that formal
legal norms will produce varied rather than predictable outcomes. Reformers should be alert to the way in which formal and informal norms
work in tandem, whether the object of regulation is economic or social.
But these observations also suggest why investing all of one's hopes
in soft law may be chimerical too. What matters for present purposes is
that, as a consequence of the larger legal reforms that are now afoot, that
background context may itself be shifting in ways that are significant to
the success, failure or simply the impact of soft approaches. It seems
particularly significant to pay attention to these possibilities where hard
and soft strategies are deployed at the same time in respect of the same
field or issue, or where hard rights are available to advance the interests
of one of the parties involved in a dispute, while the other relies on soft
norms to further its case. For example, environmental disputes may engage conflicts between capital holders with new means to challenge
environmental protections through investment protections on the one
hand and consumers or citizens invoking human rights on the other.'
Disputes in the workplace or struggles over global labor standards may
involve employers who both recognize core labor rights but also enjoy
deregulated labor markets that leave workers with diminished power,
little social protection and no alternatives to work except on whatever
terms are offered. " Efforts to address health crises may, amongst other
scenarios, pit patent holders newly enriched by the extension of the
terms of their patent protection against either individuals in need of the
protected, and therefore more expensive drugs, or states attempting to
either respond to health crises or provide basic health services to their
populaces."'
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Both previous and current experiments with decentralized and alternative modes of norm generation point to the importance of the
background institutions in any event. Collective bargaining might be
taken as a paradigmatic historic example. Negotiations between workers
and employers have often required institutional structures of a distinctly
hard character; in their absence, employers are inclined to rely upon their
default entitlements under property and contract law to unilaterally impose the terms and conditions of employment. In the most important
current laboratory of new governance in the social realm, the Open
Method of Coordination (OMC) in Europe, soft norm generation takes
place against a backdrop of norms and practices that are well-elaborated
and well-entrenched in national institutions. The OMC is not intended to
displace these institutionally entrenched entitlements, but rather to chart
a path for their evolution in the future. It is possible that the soft processes of the OMC may work to erode rather than strengthen social norms
in some states; indeed, the IMF suggests that the mechanisms of benchmarking and peer pressure to promote competitiveness and job creation
may foster the 'deregulatory' structural reforms that, in its view, are
needed." 2 However, the prospect that the overall outcome will be socially
progressive rather than regressive seems greater precisely because the
idea is not simply to dismantle these institutional underpinnings and because employment security also remains an objective. But whether, and
to what extent, this turns out to be true seems inseparable from the larger
institutional context in which the OMC operates, as well as the character
of any 'hard' reforms to which the OMC itself leads.
It is possible that the soft process of the OMC may erode rather than
strengthen those social norms in some states; however, the prospect that
the overall outcome will be socially progressive rather than regressive
seems greater precisely because the idea is not to dismantle these institutional underpinnings. Whether, and to what extent, that turns out to be
true seems inseparable from the larger institutional context in which the
OMC operates.
As these examples suggest, soft and hard norms are likely to intersect in a variety of ways. Indeed, ideas of good governance, best
practices, and optimal legal reforms may be directly implicated in the
relative positions of the parties in conflict. For this reason, it may be
quixotic to seek solutions that bracket the regime building now underway; rather, simultaneous attention to the larger governance frame seems
crucial to assessing the prospects of any soft initiatives.
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2. Human Rights
A related question is the extent to which it is safe to vest hopes for
transformative change in human rights and other public law norms.
Whatever the hopes of reformers, the recognition of human rights has
not paved the way toward a smooth incorporation of social issues into
the larger economic project; nor has it bridged the distance between the
IFIs and their critics and interlocutors, including those in other international institutions, on how to accommodate social and distributive issues
within the architecture of the new economy. Rather, the debate has
merely shifted to two issues: which human rights should be recognized
and what it means to incorporate them into the development agenda.
Here, human rights have not proved to be the trump their proponents
often hope for. If human rights have become a powerful, popular
counter-discourse to globalization and to the policies and activities of the
3
international financial and economic organizations in particular," then
the counter-reformation is already well underway. Not only have the IFIs
resisted the pressure to adopt a rights-based approach to development.
' 4
They also have a series of arguments about the "right to trade" and
have elevated transactional freedom, property rights, and the entitlement
"
to participate in markets to the level of basic human rights. ' This suggests that in second generation reforms, human rights are better
understood not as the answer to the social deficit but as the terrain of
struggle.
Part of the reason is that normative agreement does not foreclose
disagreement on other levels. The Bank's policy research report on gender equality demonstrates why it is necessary to follow the complex
institutional navigations that take place around human rights and social
justice claims; it also indicates where the protection of rights may stop
and equality objectives shade into the zone of policy, and where soft
norms or non-legal solutions may be substituted for hard or regulatory
ones." l6 In the view of the Bank, gender equality is itself a human right
and does require respect for certain rights; in some contexts, this may
require changes to legal rules. But while rules on family law, violence
113.
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against women, property rights and even political participation are identified as essential to gender equality, labor market rules and institutions
as well as social protection schemes are not."7 In the view of the Bank,
rather than rights that are intrinsic to the protection of gender equality,
they constitute policy. Here, as elsewhere, the distinction between institutions and policy is crucial: institutions are defined as rules,
enforcement mechanisms and organizations, in short hard regulatory
mechanisms; policies, by contrast, are merely goals and desired outcomes rather than entitlements." 8 Policies must be congruent with the
overall institutional scheme for good economic governance. In the
course of generating good governance norms, however, the IFIs have
already staked out a position on why many labor market rules are
counter-productive and why, to the extent that a safety net is necessary,
targeted programs are to be preferred over the provision of universal entitlements.
It is not necessary to adjudicate these claims to observe that in this
analysis, the norms and institutions that have been classically advanced
by human rights and gender equality activists and scholars to enhance
women's economic equality become separated from the right to gender
equality itself. As this illustrates, it is entirely possible to endorse human
rights and objectives such as gender equality in general terms, yet redefine their content and foreclose many of the routes by which they can be
realized. This in turn displaces many of the conflicts and struggles that
are entailed to the level of institutional design.
VI. CONCLUSION

It is clear that the criticisms that marked the first phase of neoliberal
policy-based lending and market reform have been absorbed by their
authors and reflected in a revamped conception of development. The IFs
have also served notice that they hold a different view, however, if not of
the value of the social, structural and human side, then of what these dimensions of development entail in conceptual and practical terms.
The enduring significance of second generation reforms may lie in
the fact that a wide range of social concerns are not merely being incorporated and assimilated into market reform and governance projects,
they are being transformed at the same time. While the IFIs have conceded a place for social matters within the development agenda, they
have also become their arbiters at the same time. They are now deeply
117.
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engaged in identifying the social, distributive and egalitarian objectives
that count, or count most, in the current economic context. In the process, they are altering in both subtle and far-reaching ways the manner in
which social objectives are framed and conceptualized, and they are contesting and prescribing the manner in which they should and should not
be advanced. The end result is to not merely incorporate social concerns
into the world of development. Rather, by articulating their relationship
to economic growth and managing the processes by which they are incorporated, the IFIs are effectively ranking and ordering the importance
of different social objectives and alternatively legitimizing and delegitimizing the means and strategies by which they can be pursued.
So far, their efforts to promote market-centered modes of social inclusion and equality are speculative at best and suspect at worst. Because
the social and economic agendas are now on the table together, the debates that will now ensue between the IFIs and those that have other
ideas about social justice will almost certainly revolve around such questions as the relationship between equity and efficiency. These questions
are not simply a matter of having the right values; nor can they be determined at the abstract or general level, despite the tendency of the IFIs
to present economic and social goals as generally coterminous. The content of the social-now certain to be a critical point of contention-and
the possibility of overlap or conflict between economic and social, cultural or political objectives can only be evaluated in more specific ways.
To put it another way, the fate of the social can only be analyzed through
a nuanced and detailed examination of the norms, rules and institutions
that structure the interactions of groups and individuals in particular contexts.
So far, the IFIs largely "own" the discussion on law and development: they have established an authoritative discourse on law for
development and they have formidable mechanisms for disseminating it.
So far social justice activists, whether skeptical or enthusiastic about
these new developments, have not seriously disturbed this project. But if
the larger governance and institutional agenda is implicated in the fate of
the social, then engagement with this agenda is indispensable. In centering law in second generation reforms, the IFIs have already invited this
engagement. Paradoxically, this involves taking law even more seriously
and exploring more fully the effects that have occurred thus far. This in
turn requires greatly pluralizing the forms of analysis and scholarship in
the field and recuperating the many functions other than the correction of
market failures that legal regulation necessarily serves.

